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NOTES
Inasmuch as the discussion in the McMurray case concerning implied
warranties is merely obter, the "sealed package" issue in the case of an
ordinary sale by description is not yet completely settled in Ohio. The
court in the Ouzts case was very careful to limit the conclusion it reached
to a sale by sample in a sealed package as distinguished from an ordinary
sale by description. It is to be hoped that when confronted squarely with a
"sealed package" case in an ordinary sale by description, the Ohio Supreme
Court will accept the better view as represented by the Dow Drug Co. and
Go jatowska cases.
MARSHALL I. NURNBERG
The Ohio "Dead Man" Statute
WHILE THE common law disqualification of parties to a suit to testify
has generally been abrogated by statute,' legislative restrictions have been
imposed on the competency of certain parties or interested persons to testify
in actions involving the representative of a deceased person or such other
person as the legislatures have sought to protect by these restrictions.2 The
scope of this note is to analyze the restrictions of this kind in Ohio.
The competency of a witness in actions involving the representative of
a deceased person, or such other person set forth in the statute, is regulated
by Ohio General Code Section 11495, commonly known as the "Dead Man"
statute, which provides that, with certain exceptions:8
A party4 shall not testify when the adverse party is the guardian or trus-
tee of either a deaf and dumb or an insane person, or of a child of a de-
ceased person, or is an executor or administrator, or claims or defends as
heir, grantee, assignee, devisee, or legatee of a deceased person.
Because this statute is an exception to the section making witnesses
competent generally,5 the Ohio courts have stated that it will be strictly
construed in order to admit testimony," but it will not be construed so as
to admit testimony obviously intended to be barred.7
'E.g., OHio GENERAL COD3 § 11493: "All persons are competent witnesses except
those of unsound mind, and children under ten years of age who appear incapable
of receiving just impressions of the facts and transactions respecting which they are
examined, or of relating them truly."
23 JobNs, EVIDMNcR § 772 (4th ed. 1938). See Note, 170 A.L.R. 1242 (1947).
'The exceptions are taken up separately.
'In this note the party made incompetent to testify by the "Dead Man" statute will
be referred to as the "unprotected" party; the party that may invoke the statute as
the "protected" party; and the party the protected party represents as the "disabled"
party.
'OMo GMERAL CODE § 11493. See note 1 supra.
19521
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The reasons for this statute are said to be two. First, the legislature
sought to prevent a party from having unlimited opportunity to make state-
ments which cannot be denied because of the death or some disability of the
one who would be in the best position to deny them.8 Second, it is in the
public interest to guard the estates of decedents against the setting up of
fraudulent defenses, and fraudulent claims or unfounded causes of action,
by dosing the mouth of a witness adverse to one whose mouth has been
sealed by death?
STATUTE ONLY DISQUALIFIES PARTIES
The Ohio "Dead Man" statute disqualifies a person as a witness only
when he is a party to the suit. One who is not a party is not disqualified
as a witness merely because he may be interested in the result of the litga-
non.'0 A "party" refers only to an actual litgant. l Even though a person
is a party to the suit, in order to be disqualified as a witness he must be more
than a nominal party;'1 he must be a real party to the suit, and this depends
on the actual antagonism of the parties' interests, and not on their mere
classification as plaintiff and defendant in the case.'3
To be adverse the parties must hold the affirmative and the negative of
an issue made or some material portion thereof.14 A person can not be
made incompetent as a witness by improperly including him as a party.' 5
'Goehring v. Dillard, 145 Ohio Sr. 41, 60 N.E.2d 704(1945); Io re Estate of But-
ler, 137 Ohio St. 96, 28 N.E.2d 186 (1940); Cockley Milling Co. v. Bunn, 75
Ohio St. 270, 79 N.E. 478 (1906).
'Kight v. Boren, 39 Ohio L. Abs. 96, 67 N.E.2d 48 (1943) (Wife seeking to open
and vacate a divorce decree after the death of the divorced husband came under the
"Dead Man" statute despite the provision of Ohio General Code Section 11988 de-
claring that parties to a divorce proceeding are competent to testify against each
other).
8Kight v. Boren, 39 Ohio L. Abs. 96, 67 N.E.2d 48(1943); Butler v. Youngflesh,
68 Ohio App. 342, 41 N.E.2d 147(1941); Roberts v. Briscoe, 44 Ohio St. 596,
10 N.E. 61(1887).
'Stream v. Barnard, 120 Ohio St 206. 165 N.E. 727 (1929); Banning v. Gotshall,
62 Ohio St 210, 56 N.E. 1030(1900).
"Butler v. Youngflesh, 68 Ohio App. 342, 41 N.E.2d 147 (1941) (witness was
plaintiff's sister); Hess v. Clutz, 8 Ohio App. 57(1917) (wife of plaintiff); Kight
v. Boren, 39 Ohio L. Abs. 96, 67 N.E.2d 48(1943); Keyes v. Gore, 42 Ohio St.
211(1884).
2 Powell v. Powell, 78 Ohio St. 331, 85 NE. 541(1908).
"Butler v. Youngflesh, 68 Ohio App. 342, 41 N.E.2d 147 (1941); Cockley Mill-
ing Co. v. Bunn, 75 Ohio St. 270, 79 N.E. 478(1906).
"In Wolf v. Powner, 30 Ohio St. 472 (1876), it was held error to exclude the testi-
mony of one who had merely joined with his wife as a plaintiff because of her
coverture, the court explaining that he was not the real party but only a formal or
nominal party.
" Niederlehner v. Weatherly, 78 Ohio App. 263, 69 N.E.2d 787 (1946).
"Brocalsa Chemical Co. v. Langsenkamp, 32 F.2d 725(6th Cir. 1929); Loney v.
Walkey, 102 Ohio St. 18, 130 N.E. 158 (1921).
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It matters not whether the parties stand upon the same"0 or opposite' sides
of the case, as long as they are adversely related in the action and the issues
at the time of the trial.
The facts of the case and the substantive law involved determine when
the parties are adversely interested. In two cases' 8 a co-maker of a note
in default for answer was allowed to testify in a suit on the note brought by
a protected party against the other co-maker. In each case the court found
that the two makers were principal and surety, and held that since only the
surety had answered the principal was allowed as a witness. He did not
stand with the answering defendant as a party to the suit because a dis-
charge of the surety does not decrease the liability of the principal. How-
ever, in Baker v. Jerome1 a co-maker who was in default of answer was
held incompetent to testify in a suit against his co-maker by a protected
party. The court stated that since no evidence was offered to show that
the co-makers were anything but principals, the defendant in default of
answer had the right to avail himself of the successful defense of usury set
up by his co-maker, and thus stood with the answering co-maker as a party
to the suit.
The fact that for many purposes the agent and the principal are con-
sidered as one had raised some problems under the 'Dead Man" statute. It
appears to be settled law in Ohio that the agent of one who is an unpro-
tected party to a suit is not, because of the principal-agency relation, held
incompetent as a witness. The general view is that no fiction of identity
of principal and agent operates to defeat the admission of evidence.20 Thus
in Shaub v. Smith2' it was held that a vendor's agent who sells goods for
his principal is not rendered incompetent as a witness to the circumstances
of the transaction because of the death of the vendee. Likewise, the officers
of a corporation may testify where the corporation is the unprotected party,
even though the courts recognize that a corporation can act only through
its agents.22 In the case where the agent with whom the unprotected party
"'Edwards v. Edwards, 24 Ohio St. 402 (1873).
'See note 14 supra.
Baker v. Kellog, 29 Ohio St. 663 (1876); Bell v. Wilson, 17 Ohio St. 640 (1867).
" 50 Ohio St. 682, 35 N.E. 1113(1893).
58 AM. Jun., Witnesses § 270.
50 Ohio St. 648, 35 N.E. 503(1893).
"Inre Estate of Kennedy, 82 Ohio App. 359, 80 N.E.2d 810(1948). It is a gen-
eral rule that a statute which in terms applies only to a party to the record is not, by
construction, to be made to embrace those who are not parties, even though they
have an interest in the event of the sut. Cockley Milling Co. v. Bunn, 75 Ohio
St. 270, 79 N.E. 478(1906).
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has transacted business is now dead, the principal being still alive or the
transaction having occurred after the death of the principal, Ohio courts
allow the testimony of the unprotected party even though there may be no
other witness to the transactionL23
When the agent is himself a party to the suit, his testimony is subject
to the same tests of competency that are applicable to the testimony of other
parties. Thus, he may be incompetent to testify as a witness as to his own
agency or as to an alleged contract made as an agent.24
Cases have arisen where the testimony of the witness is competent
against one defendant and incompetent against another defendant. It has
been held 25 that where separate judgments against the defendants can be
entered, the testimony of the witness should be allowed if it is competent as
to one. It is necessary, however, that the court be sufficiently advised that
the evidence is being offered only against the one. If separate judgments
cannot be entered the testimony cannot be admitted.26
WArE OF THE STATuTE
At one time it was held27 that the "Dead Man" statute is intended to
carry out a policy of the law and the testimony might be rejected by the
court even where no objection was offered by the protected party. Today,
it is apparently recognized 28 that the exclusion of testimony is a privilege
which the protected party may waive.2 9
Thus the "Dead Man" statute does not prevent the protected party from
calling the unprotected party to testify s In Roberts v. Br~sco,8 where the
'Trumpler v. Royer, 18 Ohio App. 151(1918); First National Bank v. Cornell,
41 Ohio St. 401(1884); Cochran v. Almack, 39 Ohio St. 314(1883); Vulcan
Corp. v. Hanzel, 37 Ohio App. 75, 174 N.E. 146(1930) However, where a corpo-
ration is the protected party, the unprotected party is not competent to testify to
transactions or communications with the deceased agent of the corporation who
conducted the business, as the corporation, being a mere artificial person, cannot
be the survivor of an agent and can have no knowledge of the transaction or com-
munication in question. 3 JoNEs, EviDENcE § 789(4th ed. 1938)
'Roberts v. Remay, 56 Ohio St. 249, 46 N.E. 1066(1897).
'Totten v. Estate of Miller, 139 Ohio St. 29, 37 N.E.2d 961(1941).
' See Note, 23 Ohio Op. 107(1939).
'Brown v. A Raft of Timber, 1 Handy 13,12 Ohio Dec. Rep. 1(1854).
Roberts v. Briscoe, 44 Ohio St. 596,10 N.E. 61 (1887); Borgerding v. Ginocchio,
69 Ohio App. 231, 43 N.E.2d 308(1942); Crowe v. Vickery, 23 Ohio App. 83,
155 N.E. 247(1927); Atley v. Atley, 20 Ohio App. 497, 152 N.E. 761(1925); 42
OHIO JURISPRUDENCE § 160, pg. 167
'Farley v. Lisey, 55 Ohio St. 627, 45 N.E. 1103(1897). An objection on the
ground that the evidence is incompetent is sufficient; it is not necessary to object
to the witness as incompetent.
" OHio GENEIur. CODE § 11497- "At the instance of the adverse party, a party
may be examined as if under cross-examination, either orally, or by deposition, like
any other witness "
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unprotected party daimed that the statute created a complete bar and he
could not therefore be called to testify, the court explained that what was
intended for the benefit and the protection of the estate should not be per-
mitted to operate as a source of injury by denying the protected party evi-
dence. The court pointed out that the facts upon which the protected party
founds his daim or defense may be known only to the unprotected party,
and the legislature could not have intended to place the estates of deceased
persons at a disadvantage by depriving them of evidence within reach and
necessary to their protection against fraud 3 2
Failure of the protected party to object to the testimony of the unpro-
tected party also constitutes a waiver of the privilege.8 3
An interesting waiver problem arose in the case of Verbsky v. Burger3
which throws some doubt on whether the statute is a prohibition or a
privilege. In that case both parties were protected parties under the "Dead
Man" statute and the plaintiff tried to call the other party to testify. A
majority of the court held that she could not do so since both parties were
protected parties and that the statute "provides specifically and unambigu-
ously that 'a party shall not testify' -language too plain to require construc-
tion." The dissent, citing many Ohio cases and legal works in accord, stated
that Section 11495 does not make a witness within the limitation of the
statute incompetent as such under all circumstances, but that it creates a
privilege in the protected party by which such protected party may, under
certain circumstances, prevent a party from testifying. Being a privilege it
may be waived. The dissent pointed out that in addition to those cases
authorizAng waiver there are numerous cases considering other issues arising
out of the examination of parties under conditions similar to those involved
in this case, and that in none of those cases was the right to conduct such
examination contested. The dissent further stated that this testimony of
defendant would not be considered a waiver of defendanes rights, so as to
permit the plaintiff to then testify against the defendant, since the waiver of
defendanes rights under the fourth exception to the "Dead Man' statute
could arise only from his voluntary testimony. Though this case has not
been overruled it would appear that the view of the dissent is the more
logical because if one in whose favor the statute operates may waive the pro-
tection by failing to object to the testimony of the unprotected party, he
'44 Ohio St. 596, 10 NE. 61 (1887).
"The unprotected party should not be able to complain, for thereafter he is com-
petent by reason of Ohio General Code Section 11495-(4) to testify in his own
behalf to any matter relevant to any issue in the case of which he has knowledge.
Stream v. Barnard, 120 Ohio St. 207, 165 N.E. 727(1929); Alger v. Alger, 10
Ohio App. 93 (1918).
'Kaiser v. Whetstone, 33 Ohio L Abs. 432 (1941).
" 146 Ohio St. 235, 65 N.B.2d 695(1946).
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certainly should be able to do it by affirmatively calling him as his own
witness, even though the other party is also a protected party.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE STATUTE
The state legislature, perhaps cogmzant of the fact that the "Dead Man"
statute has met with criticism, has from time to tune provided exceptions to
the statute. They are intended to provide for particular situations where
the admissibility of the testimony would tend to secure rather than to
prevent equality. In many respects these exceptions have been liberally
construed to conform to the coures policy of admitting evidence rather than
excluding it.
The first exception permits an otherwise unprotected party to testify
as to:
(1) The facts which occurred after the appointment of the guardian
or trustee of an insane person, and, in the other cases, after the time the
decedent, grantor, assignor, or testator died.'
The unprotected party is allowed to testify as to these facts for they do not
come within the reason of the statute. Death or insanity has not sealed
the disabled party's lips as to these facts, he never having had knowledge of
them. However, mere lack of knowledge by the disabled party is not suf-
ficient to make the unprotected party competent. Thus, in Nolan v. Har-
bere" an unprotected party could not testify to a fact which occurred after
the disabled party was insane, but before his insanity had been officially
declared, even though the facts of the case were not within his personal
knowledge.
In Poce v. The Cleveland Trust Co.37 the unprotected party, in order
to prove the ownership of his claim against the protected party, attempted
to prove an oral assignment which took place before the other's death by
testifying that after the death of the disabled party there was in force an
assignment of the laim. In sustaining the objection that this testimony
was improper the court explained that where proof of the existence of a
fact after the death of a disabled party relates to the existence of such fact
prior to his death, which continued to exist after death, the evidence of such
fact after death is incompetent because it did not "occur" after death.
The second exception allows the unprotected party to testify-
(2) When the action or proceeding relates to a contract made through
an agent by a person since deceased, and the agent is competent to testify
as a witness, a party may testify on the same subject.'
" O-o GENERAL CODE § 11495- (1).
'3 Ohio App. 45(1914).
"81 Ohio App. 221, 77 N.E.2d 621(1947).
"OHio GENERAL CODE § 11495 (2)
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Here it has been held that the reason for the rule of incompetency no
longer obtains, since the disabled principal's mouth is not dosed by death,
inasmuch as his agent is liable to testify as fully about the matter as the
principal would have been had he not died. 9 However, if the disabled
principal's agent died prior to the time of the trial, the unprotected party
is incompetent to testify to facts occurring before the death of the disabled
party.40
The third exception states that:
(3) If a party, or one having a direct interest, testifies to transactions
or conversations with another party, the latter may testify as to the same
transactions or conversations."
Chronologically this exception was enacted after the waiver principles,
above discussed, had been judicially delineated. The purpose of this pro-
vision is to extend the right of the unprotected party to testify beyond these
judicially determined limits.42 The "direct interest" referred to in this ex-
ception means an interest in the event of the suit -a pecuniary interest, for
example.43
The unprotected party can not qualify himself as a witness within this
exception by calling the protected party as upon cross-examination, for the
exception applies only where the protected party testifies voluntarily to
protected matters. 4 Similarly the rule of the present exception does not
extend to the case where a person has unproperly, upon his application, been
made party defendant or plaintiff with the protected party. In such cases,
say the courts, that person is not a party to the suit within the meaning of
the statute so as to enable the unprotected party to testify after such person
has testified to the same transaction. 5
The fourth exception states that:
(4) If a party offers evidence of conversations or admissions of the
opposite party, the latter may testify concerning the same conversation or
admissions'
As in the case of the third exception the purpose of this provision is to
enlarge the right of the unprotected party to testify.Y The phrase "con-
versations or admissions" in this exception means oral statements only."
"Union Trust Co. v. Johnson, 42 Ohio App. 301, 182 N.E. 137(1931).
" Floro v. Wasdworth, 43 Ohio App. 1, 182 N.E. 594 (1929).
"Orto GENERAL CODE § 11495 (3).
' Stream v. Barnard, 120 Ohio St. 206, 165 N.E. 727(1929).
"Williams v. Longley, 3 Ohio C.C. 508, 2 Ohio C. Dec. 292(1888).
"Hickox v. Rogers, 33 Ohio App. 97, 168 N.E. 750(1928).
"Williams v. Longley, 3 Ohio C.C. 508, 2 Ohio C.Dec. 292(1888).
"OHro GENERAL CODE § 11495 (4).
"'Stream v. Barnard, 120 Ohio St. 206, 165 N.E. 727(1929).
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It has been held that this phrase does not apply to written admissions for the
reason that written admissions speak for themselves; they are composed
of the very words chosen or adopted by the person against whom they are
offered in evidence and thus do not present the problems of inaccuracy and
ambiguity raised by oral statements.49
The protected party may offer the evidence by anyone, including the
unprotected party, upon either direct or cross-examination. If the evidence
is introduced by the protected party or one of his witnesses, the unprotected
party is thereby rendered competent to testify fully concerning the same
transaction or admission ° However, if the evidence is offered by calling
the unprotected party as upon cross-examination, the unprotected party is
thereby rendered competent to testify to any matter that is relevant to any
issue in the case.5
The fifth exception states:
(5) In an action or proceeding by or against a partner or joint con-
tractor, the adverse party shall not testify to transactions with, or admis-
sions by, a partner or joint contractor since deceased, unless they were
made in the presence of the surviving partners or joint contractor. This
rule applies without regard to the character in which the parties sue or
are sued 2
Thus the unprotected party cannot be excluded completely from testify-
ing concerning his relations with the deceased; he is competent to testify
as to the acts done or the statements made by the deceased in the presence
of the survivor.5 ' The reason for the general statutory rule is lacking where
the evidence is available at the time of trial by the surviving partner or joint
contractor because the evidence of the unprotected party might be readily
controverted by the survivor.9 4
It is immaterial whether the suit is brought against the survivor alone
or against him and the deceased party jointly. The same rule applies in
either action. 5 As the statute has nothing to do with the survivor, the sur-
vivor himself may of course testify. 6
" Jackson v. Ely, 57 Ohio St. 450, 49 N.E. 792(1897).
"Whitehead v. Parsons, 16 Ohio L. Abs. 274(1934).
"3Stream v. Barnard, 120 Ohio St. 206, 165 N.E. 727(1929); Rankin v. Hannan,
38 Ohio St. 438 (1882); McNaughton v. Presbyterian Church, 35 Ohio App. 443,
172 N.E. 561 (1930). Cf. Miller v. Miller, 32 Ohio L. Abs. 459(1939).
"Stream v. Barnard, 120 Ohio St. 206, 165 N.E. 727(1929); Alger v. Alger, 10
Ohio App. 93 (1918)
" OHiO GENERA. CODE § 11495 (5).
'Baxter v. Leith, 28 Ohio St. 84 (1876); Troop v. Freed Fireworks Co., 38 Ohio
L. Abs. 571 (1943); Steigert v. Steigert, 57 Ohio App. 255, 13 N.E.2d 583 (1936);
Schlarman v. Heyn, 19 Ohio App. 64(1923); Brinker v. Schreiber, 8 Ohio Dec.
Rep. 759(1885).
"Harrison v. Neely, 41 Ohio St. 334 (1884); Roberts v. Davis, 66 Ohio App. 527,
35 N.E.2d 609(1940).
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The sixth exception states that:
(6) If the claim or defense is founded on a book account, a party
may testify that the book is his account book, that it is a book of original
entries, that the entries therein were made in the regular course of busi-
ness by himself, a person since deceased, or a disinterested person. The
book shall then be competent evidence in any case, without regard to the
parties, upon like proof by any competent witness.O'7
The book must be one of original entry5 s and the charges in the book
account must be contemporaneous with the transactions. 9 If the book of
original entry has been destroyed the ledger can be introduced, if the tran-
script to the ledger was properly made.60 The party offering the book
account may be questioned as to his habits of making mistakes and may be
impeached by showing that his books have a reputation for being inaccu-
rate.0 '
The seventh exception states that:
(7)" If after testifying orally, a party dies the evidence may be proved
by either party on a further trial of the case, whereupon the opposite party
may testify to the same matter.'
This exception relates to testimony taken in the same sUIt. 3 When
either party introduces the testimony of the disabled party, taken at a previ-
ous trial, the fundamental reason for the statute creating the incompetency is
removed. In this situation fraud or injustice cannot be done by permitting
the unprotected party to testify."4 In construing this exception it has been
held that the testimony of the disabled party in a former action may be
offered by the unprotected party in a subsequent suit in his own behalf.
However, the unprotected party may not introduce it for the purpose of
contradicting it.65
'Harrison v. Neely, 41 Ohio St. 334(1884).
' Schlarman v. Heyn, 19 Ohio App. 64(1923).
ITOmIo GENERAL CODE § 11495(6). It appears that few cases have been decided
under this exception since the enactment in 1937 of Omo GENERAL CODE SEcTIoN
12102-23, the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act.
'Baxter v. Leith, 28 Ohio St. 84(1875).
" Bogert v. Cox, 4 Ohio CC. 289, 2 Ohio C.Dec. 551 (1890).
eBurr v. Shute, 2 Ohio C.C.(N.S.) 343, 14 Ohio C. Dec. 62(1902); Kennedy v.
Dodge, 19 Ohio CC. 425, 10 Ohio C. Dec. 360(1899).
'Sheridan v. Tenner, 5 Ohio C.C. 19, 3 Ohio C. Dec. 10(1890).
=OHIo GENER. CODE § 11495(7). Cf. Quartors v. Lamping, 3 Ohio L. Abs.
125 (1924). Prior to the enactment of this statute in its present form, where a
deceased witness was one of the partes, and the administrator became a party, the
administrator could not introduce the former evidence of the decedent. Hoover v.
Jennings, 11 Ohio St. 624(1860).
"Conett v. Squair, 17 Ohio Ddc. (N.P.) 65, 3 Ohio L. Rep. 558(1906).
"Matthews v. Heider, 22 Ohio Dec.(N.P.) 399(1912).
"Conett v. Squair, 17 Ohio Dec.(N.P.) 65, 3 Ohio L. Rep. 558(1906)
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The eighth exception states that:
(8) If a party dies and his deposition be offered in evidence the op-
posite party may testify as to all competent matters thereto.'
This exception dearly relates to former testimony in the same slut, and
not to testimony taken in another suit or another court though between the
same paries.67 However, the deposition of a disabled party is admissible
in an action properly revived. 8 In the case of an action properly revived
the unprotected party may introduce such testimony of the disabled party
into evidence in his own behalf, but he cannot do so for the purpose of
contradicting it by taking the stand himself and testifying.69
If the protected party files a deposition of the disabled party but does
not offer it in evidence at the trial of the case, he does not waive the statutory
privilege against testimony of the unprotected party.79
The competency of a deposition is to be determined by the rules applica-
ble to the witness himself if present. Thus, although the witness was com-
petent to testify when the deposition was taken, yet if he is a party to an
action and the adverse party has died since the deposition was made, it is
incompetent against the personal representative of the adverse party.71
Further exceptions to the general exclusionary rule are provided in the
last paragraph of the "Dead Man" statute, which reads:
Nothing in this section shall apply to actions for causing death, or
actions or proceedings involving the validity of a deed, will, or codicil;
and when a case is plainly within the reason and spirit of the next three
preceding sections, though not within the strict letter, their principles shall
be applied.
Where the administrator of the deceased person sues the otherwise un-
protected party for the wrongful death of the deceased, the otherwise un-
protected party may testify in his own defense.7 2 This wrongful death ex-
ception does not apply where the injured party died from other causes after
the accident7 3 and suit has been brought for the personal injuries. 4
1OHio GENERAL CODE § 11495(8). If a party dies and his deposition is offered
in evidence it is admissible. Hoover v. Jennings, 11 Ohio St. 624(1860).
' Conett v. Squair, 17 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 65, 3 Ohio L. Rep. 558(1906)
"Goehring v. Dillard, 145 Ohio St. 41, 60 N.E.2d 704(1945).
"Conett v. Squair, 17 Ohio Dec.(N.P.) 65, 3 Ohio L. Rep. 558(1906).
"Prince v. Abersold, 123 Ohio St. 464, 175 N.E. 862(1931); Isabella v. Feiss, 26
Ohio L Abs. 382(1938).
"Bettman v. Hunt, 9 Ohio Dec. Repr. 396(1883).
'
2 Ransom v. Haberer, 13 Ohio C.C.(N.S.)511(1910)
"Cox v. Waltz, 13 Ohio L. Abs. 364(1932)
' In Barber v. Kihiken, 17 Ohio L. Abs. 599(1934), the unprotected party brought
action for personal injuries. The protected administrator by cross-petition sought
judgment for the wrongful death of his intestate but during the trial submitted
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The legislature has withdrawn a will or codicil contest from the opera-
tion of the "Dead Man" statute.7m In such cases the sole reason for the
prohibition wholly fails, as the parties are not in privity with the deceased,
the property and estate left by him is neither increased nor diminished by
the result of the trial, he could never have been a party to the controversy nor
testified in relation to its subject matter, and no evidence in favor of either
party was lost by his death.7 6
An action involving the validity of a deed, will or codicil, within the
meaning of the statute, is one involving an attack upon the legal sufficiency
of the instrument, and a party may offer evidence under this exception
only as to circumstances directly bearing upon the legal sufficiency of the
instrument attacked. 7 Therefore, the statute does not include an action to
construe a will,78 or an action to establish or enforce a trust under the will
or deed.79 It is wholly immaterial that the action is one for money only, if
the determination of the right to the money claimed in any way involves
the validity of a deed by the decedent80
The so-called "reason and spirit" clause cannot be invoked or applied
in contravention of the express provisions of the statute relative to the com-
petency of witnesses.8 ' The law is not that the exceptions are to be multi-
plied by judicial construction, but that the principles of the three sections
mentioned in the "reason and spirit' clause are to be applied when a case,
to dismissal of the cross-petition. By way of dictum the court noted that had the
cause been submitted upon the issues made on the cross-petition, the testimony of
the unprotected party would have been competent on those issues; but even then
the court must instruct the jury not to consider the testimony of the unprotected
party upon the issues made on the petition.
"Wilson v. Wilson, 7 Ohio N.P.(N.S.) 435(1908). The statute also contains
an exception permitting a party to testify concerning a deed.
"
8Wolf v. Powner, 30 Ohio St. 472 (1876).
" Rieger v. Hotel Rieger Co., 124 Ohio St. 152, 177 N.E. 211(1931); Murdock v.
McNeely, 1 Ohio C.C. 16, 1 Ohio C. Dec. 9(1885).
" Miller v. Miller, 15 Ohio C.C.(N.S.) 481, 34 Ohio C.C. 43, modified, 88 Ohio
St. 609, 106 N.E. 665(1913), modified and afd o" rehearng 90 Ohio St. 28,
106 N.E. 666(1914).
'Marker v. Menke, 10 Ohio L. Abs. 688(1931); Rieger v. Hotel Rieger Co., 124
Ohio St. 152, 177 N.E. 211(1931); Paddock v. Adams, 56 Obio St. 242, 46 N.E.
1068 (1897).
8'Tootle v. Lane, 12 Ohio L. Abs. 273(1932). (However, an action for damages
for false representation made by the deceased grantor as to the quantity of land in a
certain tract purchased by the plaintiff, where no demand for relief is based upon
the validity of the deed given by the decedent, is purely a demand for money, in
no way involving the deed, and the plaintiff is not competent to testify as to the
representation.)
'Loney v. Walkey, 102 Ohio St. 18, 130 N.E. 158(1921); Powell v. Powell, 78
Ohio St. 331, 85 N.E. 541 (1908); Keyes v. Gore, 42 Ohio St. 211 (1884); Cochran
v. Almack, 39 Ohio St. 314(1883).
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not within their letter, is plainly within their reason and spirit.8 2 In Stern-
berger v. Hanna 3 it was held that to warrant the application of this clause
the case must be plainly within the "reason and spirit" of Ohio General
Code Section 11493, which makes all persons competent to testify except
those therein named, as well as within Ohio General Code Sections 11494
and 11495, which relate to the exclusion of certain named persons, under
the special circumstances therein named.
Specific application of this rule to Section 11495 is found in the case
of Butler v. Youngflesh. 4 It was there held that the "reasons and spirit"
clause was not intended to enlarge or diminish the class of persons pro-
hibited from testifying by the first paragraph of the section, but was in-
tended solely to liberalize and enlarge the exceptions contained in the inter-
vening paragraphs, which set forth circumstances under which a party
may testify notwithstanding his general disqualification as set forth in
the first paragraph.
In one situation, which may be termed a judicial exception to the "Dead
Man" statute, the unprotected party can testify as to matters that occurred
before the death of the other party to the suit. In Robertson v. Polters"5
the court stated that the "Dead Man" statute has no application to pro-
ceedings against an unprotected party upon complaint of an executor under
Ohio General Code Section 10506-67, relative to discovery of concealed
or embezzled assets, and does not prohibit the unprotected party so cited
from testifying as to transactions with the executor's decedent. "It would
be strangely incongruous if a person thus accused were prohibited from
speaking in his own defense."8' 6
CONCLUSION
It is apparent from a review of the statute, its exceptions and the inter-
pretations, that a great deal of litigation has resulted without certainty of
construction being achieved. The legislature has attempted to strike a
2 Cockley Milling Co. v. Bunn, 75 Ohio St. 270, 79 N.E. 478(1906).
' 42 Ohio St. 305 (1884)
" 68 Ohio App. 342, 41 N.E.2d 147(1941).
' 58 Ohio App. 204, 206, 16 N.E.2d 485,486(1937).
S Ibu2.
"As a matter of policy, this survival of a part of the now discarded interest-qualifi-
cation is deplorable in every respect; for it is based on a fallacious and exploded
principle, it leads to as much or more false decisions than it prevents, and it en-
cumbers the profession with a profuse mass of barren quibbles over the interpreta-
tion of mere words." 2 WiGMORE, EvIDNCE 697 (3d ed. 1940)
6 3
"The modern tendency of the law of evidence is to open the doors to all material
and relevant proof and let those reasons which operated to deny competency on ad-
missibility be used to test weight and credibility." Ladd, Admssston of Ei*tence
Agamt Estates. 19 IowA L. REv. 521,538(1934)
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